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We study in a VAR model the effects of monetary policy shocks with new Italian flow of funds 
data for 1980-2002. First, our results are consistent with the literature, without being affected 
by commonly found puzzles. Second, new features of the transmission of monetary policy 
shocks to the Italian economy are provided. We do not find evidence in favour of financial 
frictions  which  would  prevent  firms  from  a  prompt  reduction  of  nominal  expenditures. 
Households also quickly adjust their portfolios leading to a careful evaluation of the hypothesis 
underlying limited participation models. Finally, the public sector increases net borrowing after 
the shock, improving on puzzling opposite results in the literature. 
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1.  Introduction 
After the seminal paper by Sims (1980) an extensive literature begun to assess the 
effects  of  exogenous  monetary  policy  shocks  on  the  business  cycle  with  vectorial  auto-
regressive models (VAR). The impact of such shocks on the flows of borrowing and lending 
of economic agents, such as firms, households and the public sector, has been much less 
investigated. Nevertheless, we think that the analysis of the changes in the financing and 
investment  activities  of  the  different  sectors  of  the  economy,  i.e.  in  their  demand  for 
financial assets and supply of financial liabilities, in response to unexpected variations in the 
policy  interest  rate,  may  be  very  important  for  studying  the  transmission  mechanism  of 
monetary policy and its effects on the business cycle. 
To  fully  capture  these  responses,  Christiano,  Eichenbaum  and  Evans  (1996)  (CEE 
(1996) hereafter), analysed the effects of U.S. monetary policy with a VAR model applied to 
the flows-of-funds data from 1961 to 1991. This choice allowed them to perform an analysis 
of the variations of the financial assets and liabilities of each economic sector, and within 
those  two  aggregates,  of  the  different  classes  of  financial  instruments.  The  economic 
literature did not pursue afterwards this research area, possibly because of the absence of 
historical time series of adequate length, frequency and level of detail. 
The recent availability of reconstructed quarterly flow-of-funds time series for Italy 
from 1980, made possible in this work to analyse the effects of monetary policy on the 
choices  of  financing  and  investment  of  the  economic  sectors  (non  financial  firms, 
households, general government, financial firms and the foreign sector) with a VAR model, 
exploiting  the  information  content  of  the  heterogeneity  of  the  response  to  the  monetary 
policy shocks in Italy. 
This is actually, to our best knowledge, the first attempt to exploit the rich information 
content of a fully integrated and internally consistent accounting framework like the Italian 
financial accounts, in order to examine the effects of monetary policy with a VAR model. 
According to our results, the use of such data can provide further insights into the empirical 
evaluation of the effects of monetary policy in Italy. 
   3
2.  Related literature 
The use of VAR methodology to assess the effects of unexpected monetary policy 
shocks on the economic system has been very intense in the recent past.
2 In this section we 
recall the main results of such literature, focusing on the papers which are more closely 
related  to  our  aim  of  analysing  the  financing  and  investment  decisions  of  the  Italian 
economic sectors with flow-of-funds data. 
The issue of how to evaluate empirically the reaction of the borrowing and lending 
behaviour of different categories of economic agents to monetary policy shocks, was first 
addressed by CEE (1996), who used the US flow of funds. Among their results, net funds 
raised by  firms  in  the  financial  markets (that  is,  net  incurrence  in new  liabilities  net  of 
acquisition  of  financial  assets)  increase  for  about  a  year  after  a  tightening  of  monetary 
policy, and begin to fall only later, when a recession takes place. The authors point to the 
existence of financial frictions which would prevent firms from adjusting immediately their 
level of inventories to the new (lower) level of demand, as standard monetary business cycle 
models would predict. This might happen because of a limited ability of altering quickly 
nominal expenditures, possibly due to contracts in place. A second result is that households 
do not adjust their financial position to monetary policy shocks for a number of quarters, in 
line  with  the  predictions  of  limited  participation  models  that  claim  a  certain  degree  of 
rigidity of households in adjusting their financial assets and liabilities. Finally, there appears 
to be a (surprising) temporary reduction in net lending of the government.
3 
Since we are interested in extending this kind of study to the Italian case, we find 
necessary to compare our results with those of authors who employed the VAR methodology 
to investigate the mechanism of monetary policy shocks transmission to the Italian economy. 
Their main findings are recalled in the following. 
According to Gaiotti (1999), the interest rate on main refinancing operations of the 
Bank of Italy is a suitable measure of monetary policy in Italy.
4 Adopting a structural VAR 
                                                           
2  For a review of the literature see, among others, Bagliano and Favero (1998), Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) (hereafter CEE(1999)) and Kim (1999). 
3  CEE(1996) deem this letter result to be “puzzling” and point, as a possible explanation for that, to a 
temporary increase in personal tax receipts, which vanishes after about a year, as the recession takes hold. 
4 See Gaiotti (1999) also for a detailed description of the transmission of monetary policy in Italy from 1967 
to 1997.   4
model, the author finds that following an unexpected increase in the policy interest rate 
output  and  prices  fall.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the  results  of  the  international 
literature. 
De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (2001) provide a further term of comparison, proposing 
an identification method based on a detailed institutional analysis of the Italian monetary 
policy procedures (limited to the ‘90s). The analysis suggested the authors to choose the 
overnight interest rate as the most suitable monetary policy indicator. Moreover, they find 
the exchange rate to play an essential role in their model, given that Italy is identified as a 
small open economy. 
Dedola  and  Lippi  (2005)  analyse  the  monetary  transmission  mechanism  with 
disaggregated  industry data  from  five  industrialised  countries, including Italy.  They  find 
significant differences across industries as to the effects of monetary policy. Sectoral output 
responses to monetary policy shocks turns out to be systematically related to the industry 
output durability, financing requirements, borrowing capacity and firm size. Their approach, 
following  CEE  (1999),  uses  a  recursiveness  assumption  to  identify  the  unexpected 
component of monetary policy and seems to fit the Italian data quite well. 
Neri  (2004)  focuses  on  the  relation  between  monetary  policy  and  stock  prices, 
suggesting a structural VAR approach to study the case of Italy. Similarly to other studies, 
they  assume  a  Choleski  identification  scheme  for  the  reduced  form  variance-covariance 
matrix of the VAR residuals corresponding to commodity price index, nominal exchange 
rate, consumer price index and industrial production index. Non-recursive restrictions, on the 
other hand, are imposed on the short-term interest rate, a monetary aggregate and the stock 
market index. The results of the paper are in line with other works which used different 
identification schemes. 
As to the study of the reaction of Italian firms to monetary policy shocks, Gaiotti and 
Generale (2002) estimate the effects of monetary policy on the investment behaviour of a 
number of categories of Italian firms, using a panel data-set from the Company Accounts 
Data  Service  (Centrale  dei  Bilanci).  Their  main  findings  are  that  financial  variables  do 
actually matter, and that the difference in the response of investment by different types of 
firms to monetary policy is not negligible.   5
3.  Data 
Flow-of-funds data enable us to examine the links among the financial positions of the 
different sectors of the economy, allowing for the possibility of reconciling the fact that 
saving and real capital formation in any period are identical for the economy as a whole, 
while at the same time individual spending units (sectors) still have the option of investing 
(in real assets) more or less than they have saved. For each sector, in fact, the difference 
between fixed investment and gross saving results in a change in the net financial position, 
also called “net lending/net borrowing”, towards the rest of the economy (both domestic and 
foreign sectors). For sector i, in fact, 
  i i i i FA FL S I - = - = net funds raised  (1) 
where  S  is  saving,  i.e.  the  excess  of  disposable  income  over  consumption,  I  is  tangible 
investment  (fixed  capital  formation  and  changes  in  inventories),  FL  and  FA  are  the  net 
incurrence of financial liabilities and the net acquisition of financial assets, respectively. 
Since any financial asset is necessarily a liability to someone else, for the economy as a 
whole eq. (1) reduces to the well known national accounts identity  I S = . 
We  consider  the  following  sectors:  (i)  households,  (ii)  non  financial  firms,  (iii) 
financial firms, (iv) general government, (v) foreign sector.
6 For each sector, besides net 
funds raised, we look at the assets and the liabilities components, FA and FL. Moreover, in 
the case of households and non financial firms we provide further insight observing the 
                                                           
6  In the present work we consider a purely “consumer” household sector, while in the Italian flow of 
funds it also comprises the “producer” households (small unincorporated firms and sole proprietorships with 
less than five employees). We prefer to include the latter among non financial firms, so to join all the producer 
units in the non financial sector, regardless of the firm size or of its legal form. The other sectors are consistent 
with the ESA95 (European System of National Accounts) classification, which is also applied in the Italian 
flow  of  funds.  Financial  firms  include  banks,  money  market  funds,  financial  auxiliaries  and  insurance 
corporations and pension funds (thus the Bank of Italy is not included). The general government sector includes 
central government, local government and social security funds. The foreign sector include all the units non 
resident in Italy.   6
responses  of  more  detailed  variables.  As  for  households,  for  example,  we  also  consider 
distinguish  among  deposits  (and  cash),  short-term  securities,  long-term  securities,  equity 
(both listed and unquoted) on the assets side; among liabilities, we analyse short-term and 
long-term  loans  separately.  As  for  non  financial  firms,  instead,  we  prefer  to  focus  on 
liabilities, distinguished between short-term and long-term liabilities, and further splitting 
this latter into equities and other long-term debts (corporate bonds and long-term loans). 
As regards financial assets and liabilities of the various sectors, we employ a recent 
reconstruction  of  the  flows  of  funds  data  for  Italy  since  from  1980  which  was  recently 
performed by the Statistics Sector at the Economic  Research Department. In the former 
dataset,  in  fact,  time  series  before  and  after  1995  were  not  directly  comparable,  mainly 
because of differences in the compilation methodology, in classification criteria and in the 
accounting principle introduced by the adoption of the ESA95 (European System of National 
Accounts). 
Figure 4 presents the quarterly flow of funds data for Italy. Each graph shows net 
funds borrowed (series above zero) or lent (series below zero) by the sectors from 1980 to 
2002. Not surprisingly for the Italian economy, households are net lenders over the whole 
period; the opposite is true for general government and, with very few exceptions, for non 
financial firms. 
4.  Measures of policy shocks 
4.1 Identification 
Following  CEE  (1999)  we  adopt  a  recursive  VAR  (Vector  Auto  Regression) 
approach.
7 Our model includes the industrial production index (IP), the consumer price index 
(P), the import price of raw materials in local currency (PIMP), the nominal exchange rate of 
the Italian lira vis-à-vis the German mark
8 (EXR), a policy interest rate, namely the repo 
                                                           
7 Details on the model are provided in the Appendix. 
8 The exchange rate since January 1999 is of course a constant because of the adoption of the single 
currency.   7
rate
9  (R),  and  a  monetary  aggregate  (M2).  In  the  recursive  VAR  framework,  only  the 
variables’ order matters in deriving the impulse response functions to the policy shocks. 
Variables in the yt vector are ordered from the most exogenous to the most endogenous. We 
consider the following vector in our recursive VAR model: 
  ( ) M2 R EXR P PIMP IP yt , , , , , = ¢    (1) 
All variables, except EXR and R, were seasonally adjusted. 
The ordering in the yt vector corresponds to our identifying assumption that policy 
shocks have only lagged (and no contemporaneous) effects on the first four variables in 
brackets in equation (1). Nevertheless, we assume that the monetary authorities know these 
variables at the time the interest rate level is set; in other words, IP, PIMP, P, and EXR are in 
the  information  set  of  the  central  bank  within  the  quarter.  The  only  variable  which  is 
assumed to respond to the interest rate within the same quarter is the money aggregate, M2.  
In  practice,  given  the  identification  achieved  with  the  recursiveness  assumption  of 
CEE (1999), we characterise the monetary policy as reacting contemporaneously to the non-
policy variables ordered before our monetary policy measure (the repo rate, R). On the other 
hand, these variables, i.e. industrial production, prices, import price of raw materials and the 
exchange rate, are assumed to react only with a lag to monetary policy. We consider the 
exchange rate in our specification, in line with the consideration that Italy can be regarded as 
a small open economy in the period observed.
10 We consider M2 to be the only policy 
variable, that is, a variable reacting contemporaneously to monetary policy shock, but to 
which monetary policy reacts only with a lag.
11 
                                                           
9 From 1980 to 1981: average interest rate on fixed term advances; from 1982 to 1998: auction rate on 
repurchase agreements between the Bank of Italy and credit institutions; from 1999 onwards: interest rate on 
main refinancing operations of the ECB. This latter interest rate does not present a particular break at the 
beginning of stage three of EMU with respect to the Italian repo rate, even of course the convergence  of 
interest rates begun since 1993, accelerated the pace to reach its maximum in 1998 (circumstance that we try to 
acknowledge with a dummy). 
10  The exchange rate, that is not the focus of this work,  is regarded as a non-policy variable, in line with 
Neri (2004), because of the difficulties of monetary policy to influence the exchange rate, particularly in the 
first half of the eighties. We also checked for a treatment of the exchange rate as a policy variable, postponing 
it to the interest rate in the VAR order, without detecting significant changes in the results. 
11  We chose not to perform cointegration analysis at this stage, in line with the empirical approach to 
modelling the effects of unexpected monetary usually employed in the literature. Secondly, according to Sims 
et al. (1990) standard asymptotic tests are still valid if the VAR is estimated in levels, even if the variables are 
cointegrated.   8
Our  choice  of  the  non-policy  variables  is  partially  inspired  by  Kim  and  Roubini 
(2000) who study the effects of monetary policy innovations on the G7 countries with a 
SVAR model and seem to deal with the empirical puzzles that troubled the literature with a 
certain degree of success. We chose an interest rate as indicator of monetary policy in line 
with the approach of Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and with De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio 
(2001),  who  argue  that  interest  rate  indicators  outperform  the  ones  based  on  money 
aggregates in identifying Italian monetary policy shocks. In particular, we decided to use the 
interest rate on repurchase agreements between the Central bank and the credit institutions 
which, also according to Gaiotti (1999) and Gambacorta and Iannotti (2005), better describes 
the monetary policy operating procedures adopted by Bank of Italy.
12 
The decision on how many lags to include in our VAR model was driven by the 
selection criteria reported in Table 1 (LR and Final Prediction Error) and by the quarterly 
nature of our dataset. Those considerations led us to choose four quarters as a suitable lag 
order, in line with most quarterly VAR in the empirical literature. 
The VAR residuals show no autocorrelation (LM test results are reported in Table 1) 
and no heteroschedasticity (White test results are in Table 2). Furthermore, the hypothesis of 
normality is not rejected at high significance levels for all the variables considered for the 
single equations of the VAR
13 (see the Jarque-Bera test results in Tables 3). Three point 
dummies  were  included  in  the  model,  so  to  obtain  “white”  enough  residuals  in  the  six 
estimated equations.
14 
                                                           
12  We tried to use as alternative monetary policy indicators reserve aggregates in line to CEE (1996). 
Difficulties in interpretation of these data, particularly at the beginning of the ‘80s, put us in the same position 
of other authors who considered the monetary policy in those years to be not well described by a market-based 
approach, therefore we resorted only to interest rate indicators. 
13  For  the  multivariate  case,  as  is  often  the  case  in  this  kind  of  applications,  we  can  not  reject  the 
hypothesis that there is non normality, due to the presence of kurtosis, see Table 4. 
14  The three dummies also happen to be related to the three more relevant perturbations of the monetary 
policy in the period observed. The dummy in 1992Q3 accounts for the contraction of monetary policy during 
the exchange rate crisis of fall 1992; the second dummy, in 1995Q1, corresponds to the monetary restriction 
that contrasted inflationary pressures and the exchange rate depreciation; the dummy 1998Q3 considers the 
series of interest rate cuts put in place to achieve convergence to the interest rate levels of the new monetary 
area started in 1999.   9
4.2  Assessing monetary policy shock measures 
Our measure of exogenous shocks to monetary policy is an orthogonalised shock to the 
policy interest rate, i.e. the repo rate, R. Figure 1, where the shaded areas correspond to the 
recessions of the Italian economy as identified by Altissimo et al. (2000)
15, shows that the 
residuals of the interest rate equation fit sufficiently well with the recessions’ chronology. 
With the possible exception of the first period (when the policy rate is highly volatile), the 
monetary  policy  is  relatively  tight  in  the  period  before  each  recession  and  the  stance 
becomes easier during the recession period. 
In order to further check if we have identified monetary policy shocks we control for 
the response to a one standard deviation increase in the monetary policy interest rate of the 
macroeconomic variables directly affected by monetary policy; in Figure 2 we report the 
impulse response functions.
16 
The industrial production begins to decline, though with initial limited significance, in 
the quarter following the shock and continues for about two years; it then bounces back to 
the pre-shock level three years after the shock has occurred. This result is consistent with the 
Italian empirical literature and the international VAR literature. Prices (as measured by the 
consumer price index) decline persistently starting two quarters after the shock; differently 
from  what  is  found  in  large  part  of  the  literature,  no  “price  puzzle”  is  observed.  The 
exchange  rate  appreciates  (a  lower  value  of  EXR  means  an  appreciation  if  the  Italian 
currency),  though  with  a  very  limited  statistical  significance,  reaching  the  maximum 
appreciation three quarters after the shock.
17 The money aggregate M2 declines immediately, 
consistently with the presence of a liquidity effect and then bounces back, losing statistical 
significance after a year (quite interestingly, this is also the period in which the response of 
                                                           
15  Altissimo et al. (2000) identify as recessions the periods between March 1980 and March 1983, March 
1992 and July 1993, November 1995 and November 1996. 
16  The responses of the variables to a monetary policy shock were computed with 1000 Monte Carlo 
simulations over 16 quarters; following Sims and Zha (1999) the confidence bands are one standard error wide, 
corresponding to a 68 per cent confidence interval, since “[…], for characterising likelihood shape, bands that 
correspond to 50% or 68% posterior probability are often more useful than 95% or 99% bands, and confidence 
intervals  with  such  low  coverage  probabilities  do  not  generally  have  posterior  probabilities  close  to  their 
coverage probabilities.” 
17  This result attenuates the “exchange rate puzzle” documented in Chiades and Gambacorta (2004) and in 
De Arcangelis and Di Giorgio (2001), possibly due to the circumstance that the period analysed in this work 
includes also the years before 1984 and those after 1998.   10
the interest rate is significantly different from zero, i.e. the first four quarters following the 
shock). 
In Table 6 the forecast error variance decomposition for the VAR variables is reported 
at different time horizons, i.e. from the impact up to 3 years after the shock has occurred. 
Interest rate policy shocks account for 22% of the 2-years-ahead forecast error variance of 
industrial  production,  11%  of  the  import  price  of  raw  materials  and  about  5%  of  the 
consumer price index, of the exchange rate and of M2. Monetary policy seems to be an 
important  source  of  output  fluctuations  also  looking  at  Table  7,  where  the  same 
decomposition  is  shown  for  other  macroeconomic  variables  considered  in  the  analysis: 
shocks  to  the  policy  rate  account  for  30%  of  the  2-years-ahead  forecast  error  of  fixed 
investment and for about 16% for private consumption and wages. 
In order to provide further evidence on the goodness of our identification of monetary 
policy  shocks,  following  CEE  (1996)  we  also  examine  the  responses  of  other  relevant 
macroeconomic aggregates not directly affected by monetary policy (they are not included in 
our VAR specification). As reported in Figure 3, private consumption declines persistently, 
reaching the maximum contraction after 5 quarters; collective consumption, on the other 
hand, has a positive, even if not significant, reaction. What is notable is that, as expected 
from theoretical and empirical a priori, the negative reaction to the monetary policy shock of 
the gross fixed investment, at its maximum at the seventh quarter, is more marked than that 
of  private  consumption.  The  unemployment  rate  also,  as  expected  from  the  theory  and 
similarly to the findings of CEE (1996), has a positive reaction to the monetary policy shock. 
Wages react negatively to the increase in the interest rate, possibly as a result of the fall in 
production and the rise in unemployment. The reactions of these macroeconomic variables 
seem to support our identification of the repo rate as the monetary policy indicator, and 
strengthen our confidence in having identified correctly the monetary policy shocks. 
Overall  the  results  are  consistent  with  the  theory  predictions  of  the  effects  of 
unexpected monetary policy shocks and with the empirical literature on VAR models of the 
economy.  Notably  the  results  are  not  affected  by  significant  “price  puzzle”,  “liquidity 
puzzle” or “exchange rate puzzle”, differently from the results often found in VARs models 
of the Italian economy.   11
4.3  Robustness 
We  explored  different  specifications  of  the  VAR  models  inspired  from  the  vast 
literature,  but  our  main  results  stayed  virtually  unchanged  as  for  the  qualitative  and 
quantitative responses of the model. In particular, we tried to consider different interest rates, 
such  as  a  short-term  (three  month)  interest  rate,  an  overnight  interest  rate  (partially 
reconstructed) and different averages of these rates and of the repo rate. In alternative to 
industrial production,  we  also  considered  GDP  measures.  We  tried  also,  in place  of  the 
money aggregate M2, to use other aggregates such as M1 and M3 (reconstructed), with 
different  measures,  simple  or  moving  averages,  and  different  definitions  of  the  same 
aggregate.
18 We explored also alternative measures of inflation (the GDP deflator) and of 
commodities prices (including oil or not) and, finally, a number of definitions of exchange 
rates, effective, vis-à-vis the German Mark, the US Dollar, real or nominal. We controlled 
also for the exogeneity of commodity prices, but we detected a worsening in the quality of 
the response of M2, without observing improvements in the response of the other variables, 
hence  we  preferred  to  not  assume  commodity  prices  as  exogenous.  Finally,  we  also 
controlled for an exclusion of the last four years of the sample to account for the possible 
change in the monetary policy regime, given by the start of the single currency area. Even if 
we did not detect significant changes in our results and we are not concerned with structural 
parameters, we acknowledge that the issue has to be further investigated with a thorough 
analysis of parameters stability. 
5.  Effects of monetary policy shocks on flows of funds by sector 
Following CEE (1996), our aim is to assess the effects of monetary policy shocks (an 
unexpected increase of the policy interest rate of one standard deviation, equal to 92 basis 
points) on the borrowing and lending activities of the sectors of the economy. To this aim, 
confident to have identified a reliable measure of monetary policy shocks, we move now to 
analyse  the  flow-of-funds  data  to  detect  the  dynamic  response  of  non  financial  firms, 
                                                           
18  During  the  period  of  observation,  a  part  for  the  major  methodological  break  in  1999,  when  new 
monetary aggregates definitions were adopted, also M2 witnessed changes in its definition as well as different 
definitions of M1 are conceivable. Moreover both the aggregates can be considered as evaluated at the end of 
each period, as averages, simple or moving, and seasonally adjusted or not.   12
households, general government, financial firms and the foreign sector. To do so, we add as 
the last variable in the VAR the net borrowing (total and by class of financial instrument) of 
the  five  sectors  in  turn,  employing  the  so-called  “marginal”  method:  this  implies  that 
monetary policy does not react in the short run to changes in the patterns of these variables, 
but that the behaviour of these classes of agents responds to monetary policy shocks within 
the quarter. 
In  the  rest  of  this  section  we  briefly  describe  our  results  as  to  the  borrowing  and 
lending behaviour of the sectors of the Italian economy. 
Non financial firms. – A first analysis of the response of the non financial firms to the 
monetary policy shock can be developed looking at Figure 5.  
We do not observe a strong reaction of the net flow of funds of the non financial firms, 
as  a  result  of  two  counterbalancing  reactions  on  the  asset  and  on  the  liability  side 
respectively. Accumulation of assets decrease significantly in the first two quarters and then 
the variation fades away. Total financial liabilities diminish after the monetary shock for two 
years. Shares and other equity decline significantly for only one quarter while the decrease in 
the bonds and long-term loans is protracted for one year and a half. 
Following a contractionary monetary policy shock, CEE (1996) observed an increase 
in both firms’ financial assets and liabilities (net borrowing also rises), pointing to some 
degree of inertia in the firms’ level of nominal expenditures as a possible explanation.
19 Our 
results are different in many respects: except for a slight increase in the same quarter of the 
shock, the response of net funds raised is never significant. The reduction in firms’ issuance 
of new debt is consistent with both “money view” (standard IS/LM models) and “credit 
view” (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 1988) transmission mechanisms of monetary  policy, and 
also with monetary business cycle models (Fuerst, 1994). Thus, we do not find such strong 
evidence  in  support  of  costs  inertia,  with  the  possible  exception  of  a  slight,  and  non 
significant,  increase  in  short-term  liabilities  in  the  first  three  quarters,  which  might  be 
explained by some financial frictions of the kind mentioned by CEE(1996). 
                                                           
19  CEE (1996) find, actually, that in the United States there exist frictions that prevent firms from adjusting 
immediately their level of inventories to the new lower level of demand, as, on the contrary, standard monetary 
business cycle models would predict. See also Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993).   13
The fall we observe in the acquisition of new financial assets by firms, on the other 
hand, is also in line with standard predictions on the effects of a contractionaty policy shock.  
Households. - Net funds borrowed by households decline significantly over the first 
year following the shock. In other words, households’ net financial position improves after 
the shock, as a result of a smaller debt issuance and a larger amounts of funds lent to other 
sectors (acquisition of new financial assets). 
As we can see in Figure 6, the strong result on net funds raised is the result of two 
counterbalancing, but quite weak, effects on the assets and the liabilities side. The maximum 
effect on flows of new financial liabilities is reached in the second quarter, while financial 
assets increase significantly only in the first quarter and then the positive effect vanishes. 
The responses of the flows of assets and liabilities on households was much stronger in 
CEE(1996). Looking at those aggregates, our results would seem, indeed, more consistent 
with  “limited  participation”  models  (Christiano  and  Eichenbaum,  1995)  than  those  of 
CEE(1996). Nevertheless, looking deeper at the impulse response functions of the household 
sector, an adjustment in their financial portfolio arises, more consistently with friction-free 
standard models. Within the financial assets class of instruments, in fact, deposits and shares 
show a marked decline in the first quarter. This evidence seems sensible for shares, given the 
worsened perspectives for economic activity. It could also be considered a reasonable result 
for deposits, that could fall due to an increase in the opportunity cost, if we believe that 
financial corporations do not adjust the passive interest rates as quickly as alternative liquid 
instruments available on the market, such as Treasury’s short term securities.
21 On the other 
hand,  acquisition  of  short-term  securities  increase  in  the  first  quarter,  displaying  then  a 
marked drop during the second year gradually reabsorbed; bonds, after an initial upsurge, do 
not react much to the shock. As for the liabilities, we can observe that short-term loans 
increase in the first quarter, while long-term loans decrease significantly up to the third 
quarter. This evidence, if the interest rate curve is shifted up only for the short-term part, 
since the increase in the interest rate is perceived as temporary, may indicate, like in the case 
of non financial firms, possible difficulties of households, in the first quarter after the shock, 
                                                           
21  This could reflect some sluggishness in the response of bank deposit rates as found by Gambacorta and 
Iannotti (2005), especially before the introduction of the Consolidated Law on Banking in 1993.   14
to transform short-term liabilities in long-term ones. While if the entire curve shifts upwards, 
without  increasing  the  relative  convenience  of  long-term  loans,  we  would  observe  not 
financial frictions but rational optimisation of the liabilities structure of the firms. 
Other sectors. - The picture of the effects of an unexpected tightening of monetary 
policy on the net financial flows of the other sectors, can be gauged at a glance looking at the 
responses of the total net funds raised by every sector in Figure 7. 
General  government  experiences  a  deterioration  of  the  net  financial  position, 
increasing the financial resources borrowed on the market by the other sectors; the effect is 
statistically significant from the second to the seventh quarters and might be due to a fall in 
tax receipts and to a probable increase in the burden of the service of the public debt. This 
result, coherent with existing economic literature, is an improvement with respect to CEE 
(1996), that obtained an opposite result, deemed to be puzzling. 
The limited relevance of the absolute level of the net funds raised by financial firms, 
given  the  globally  compensating  effects  of  borrowing  and  lending  flows  and  the  high 
volatility shown (see Figure 4) do not allow us to derive clear implications for this sector. 
The foreign sector’s balance (see Figure 7) does not reveal a significant response, with 
the possible exception of a slight deterioration of the financial balance one year after the 
shock.   15
6. Conclusions 
From the analysis of the response of the Italian economic system to an unexpected one 
standard deviation increase of the policy interest rate (corresponding to 92 basis point), we 
reach the following conclusions.  
The results of the VAR analysis for the main macroeconomic aggregates are consistent 
with the predictions of the theory and with the empirical literature. In the first four quarters 
industrial productions decreases of 0.43 percentage points, price levels of 0.11, money of 
0.34. Our results seem to be not affected by price and liquidity puzzles and, even if with very 
limited significance, by exchange rate puzzle. 
Non  financial  firms  in  the  first  four  quarters  decrease  both  financial  assets  and 
liabilities. As a result, net funds raised by firms do not respond significantly to the shock. 
We do not find strong evidence in our results in favour of financial frictions which would 
prevent firms, as in CEE(1996), from adjusting their nominal expenditures. Households in 
the first quarter after the shock increase short-tem liabilities, diminish the acquisition of 
liquid assets and increase that of securities. The observed “quick” adjustment of households’ 
portfolio  leads  to  a  careful  evaluation  of  the  hypothesis  of  financial  frictions  in  limited 
participation models that, on the contrary, postulate absence of variations of households’ 
financial choices in the period immediately subsequent to the official interest change.  
The public sector increases net borrowing until almost two years after the shock, due to 
an increase in the burden of the service of the public debt and to a fall in tax receipts. This 
result, consistent with the literature, nevertheless seems an improvement with respect to the 
seminal Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), that obtained a puzzling opposite result. 
We acknowledge that our results may have to be considered with caution, since a more 
formal investigation about the robustness of the results to the possibility of the existence of 
different regimes of monetary policy throughout the period of observation, and in particular 
with respect to the adoption of the single currency area in 1999, may be required. 
 Appendix 
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Appendix 1: data description 
 
 
VAR endogenous variables: 
 
IP:  log of seasonally adjusted industrial production index. 
P:  log of seasonally adjusted consumer price index. 
P_IMP:  log of seasonally adjusted import price of raw materials (in local currency). 
EXR:  log of nominal exchange rate (ITL per DM; from 1999 it is a constant). 
R:  short-term interest rate (from 1980 to 1981: average interest rate on fixed term advances; 
from 1982 to 1998: auction rate on repurchase agreements between the Bank of Italy and 
credit institutions; from 1999 onwards: interest rate on main refinancing operations of the 
ECB). 
M2:  log of seasonally adjusted monetary aggregate M2. 
 
 
VAR endogenous variables’ graphs 
 
 
Financial accounts series (converted to billions of 1995 ITL using the gdp deflator, and 
seasonally adjusted): 
-  non-financial  corporations:  net  funds  raised  (NFNET=NFTLI-NFTAS),  total  financial 
assets (NFTAS), total financial liabilities (NFTLI), short term liabilities (NFSLI), long-term 
liabilities (NFLLI=NFELI+NFDLI), shares and other equity (NFELI), other long-term debt 
(NFDLI), short-term liabilities (NFSLI=NFTLI-NFLLI); 
- financial corporations: net funds raised (FCNET=FCTLI-FCTAS), total financial assets 
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- households: net funds raised (HTNET=HTTLI-HTTAS), total financial assets (HTTAS), 
currency  and  deposits  (HTDAS),  short-term  securities  (HTSAS),  long-term  securities 
(HTBAS), shares and other equity (HTEAS), total financial liabilities (HTTLI), short-term 
loans (HTSLI), long-term loans (HTLLI); 
- general government: net funds raised (GGNET=GGTLI-GGTAS), total financial assets 
(GGTAS), total financial liabilities (GGTLI); 
-  rest  of  the  world:  net  funds  raised  (RWNET=RWTLI-RWTAS),  total  financial  assets 
(RWTAS), total financial liabilities (RWTLI).   19
Appendix 2: methodological issues 
 
We  assume  the  economy  to  be  described  by  a  structural  form  equation  like  the 
following: 
  t t u y L A = ) (   (1) 
where A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, i.e.  ... ) (
2
2 1 0 + + + = L A L A A L A , yt 
is an n´1 vector containing the variables of interest, and ut is an n´1 structural disturbances 
vector. Let  [ ] t t t u u E u ¢ = = W ) var(  be the n´n variance-covariance matrix of the structural 
disturbances; since ut are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated, the matrix W is diagonal, the 
n diagonal elements being the variances of the n structural disturbances. 
Writing (1) in reduced form gives the following representation: 
  t t t e y L B y + = ) (   (2) 
which can be estimated using OLS equation by equation. B(L) is a matrix polynomial in the 
lag  operator  L  and  the  et  terms  in  equation  (2)  are  the  VAR  (reduced-form)  residuals 
resulting  from  the  estimation  of  the  n  regressions.  We  call  [ ] t t t e e E e ¢ = = S ) var(   the 
variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. 
Stopping  for  simplicity  to  a  lag  polynomial  of  order  2,  eq.  (1)  is 
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- - + - = ; besides, it is straightforward to 
notice that the structural disturbances ut and the reduced form residuals et are related by: 
  t t u A e
1
0
- =   (3) 
where the coefficients in the A0 matrix are those of the contemporaneous relations among the 
variables in the yt vector. From eq. (3) and remembering that  S = ) var( t e  and  W = ) var( t u , 
we can easily derive  ( ) ( )
¢ ¢ =
¢ ¢ = ¢ =







0 ) ( ) var( A u u E A A u u A E e e E e t t t t t t , and thus: 
  ¢ W = S - - 1
0
1
0 A A   (4) 
The issue is now to recover the parameters in the structural form equations (1) from the 
coefficients estimated in the reduced form equations (2). Sample estimates of S can be used   20
in  order  to  obtain  maximum  likelihood  estimates  of  W  and  A0.  Given  that  S  is  a  n´n 
symmetrical matrix, it contains n´(n+1)/2 parameters, which can be estimated via OLS. On 
the right-hand side of eq. (4), instead, there are n
2 parameters to be estimated in A0 and n in 
W, that is, a total of n´(n+1) free parameters. This means that we need at least [n´(n+1)–
n´(n+1)/2] = n´(n+1)/2 additional restrictions on the right-hand side of eq. (4) in order to 
achieve identification (n of those restrictions can simply be derived normalising to 1 the 
diagonal elements of A0), so that n´(n-1)/2 further restrictions are left.  
We  make  use  of  a  Choleski  factorisation  in  order  to  orthogonalize  the  residual 
covariance matrix S. In practice, this corresponds to imposing just n´(n-1)/2 restrictions on 
the matrix A0, that is supposed to be lower triangular (all the upper diagonal elements are set 
to be 0); as a result, the VAR is just identified. 
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Appendix 3: figures and tables 
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Fig. 1 – Estimated interest rate policy shocks 
(three-quarters centered moving average)  
 
Fig. 2 – Responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock: VAR variables 
Note: estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in the short term 
interest rate. The dashed lines are ± 1 standard error bands, computed by means of Monte 


























































































quarterly data  23
Fig. 3 – Responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock: other macro variables 
Note: the estimated impulse responses were estimated from 7-variable VARs in which we added 
one of the above variables, in turn, to the original 6-variable VAR, placing it in the last position. 
The dashed lines are ± 1 standard error bands, computed by means of Monte Carlo integration, 
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Fig. 4 – Flow of funds data: net funds raised by sectors 
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Fig. 5 – Responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock: non-financial firms 
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Fig. 6 – Responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock: households 
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Fig. 7 – Responses of the flow-of-funds data to a contractionary monetary policy shock 
 
Note: the estimated impulse responses were estimated from 7-variable VARs in which we added one of 
the above variables, in turn, to the original 6-variable VAR, placing it in the last position. Dashed lines 
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Table 1 – VAR diagnostic tests: autocorrelation LM test 
(H0: no serial correlation at lag order h) 
Lags  LM-Stat  Prob. 
     
1  42.3  0.22 
2  36.5  0.45 
3  43.1  0.19 
4  38.7  0.35 
5  23.6  0.94 
6  40.0  0.30 
7  30.9  0.71 
8  31.3  0.69 
     




Table 2 – VAR diagnostic tests: White heteroschedasticity test 
Joint test:         
           
Chi-sq  df  Prob.       
 1097.60  1071   0.28       
           
Individual components:       
           
Residuals from the 
equation for  R-squared  F(51,34)  Prob.  Chi-sq(51)  Prob. 
                       
IP   0.39   0.44   0.99   34.22   0.97 
P   0.77   2.18   0.01   65.88   0.08 
P_IMP   0.64   1.17  0.31   54.85   0.33 
EXR   0.77   2.27   0.01   66.50   0.07 
R   0.65   1.22   0.27   55.69   0.30 
M2   0.55   0.82   0.74   47.57   0.61 
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Table 3 – VAR diagnostic tests: residual descriptive statistics 
and univariate normality test 
             
              Residuals from 
equation for:  IP  P  P_IMP  EXR  R  M2 
             
               Mean   2.32E-15  -1.25E-15   1.96E-13   3.91E-14  -3.64E-12  -8.03E-15 
 Median  -0.0007   6.39E-05   0.0013   0.0004  -0.0006  -0.0004 
 Max   0.0273   0.0083   0.1076   0.0446   2.7194   0.0230 
 Min  -0.0246  -0.0085  -0.0967  -0.0502  -2.2028  -0.0255 
 Std. Dev.   0.0090   0.0030   0.0418   0.0177   0.9212   0.0093 
 Sum   2.00E-13  -1.07E-13   1.69E-11   3.36E-12  -3.13E-10  -6.91E-13 
 Sum Sq. Dev.   0.0069   0.0007   0.1487   0.0266   72.133   0.0074 
 Observations   86   86   86   86   86   86 
             
               Skewness   0.237  -0.208   0.041   0.063   0.125   0.133 
 Kurtosis   3.496   3.186   2.821   3.835   3.587   3.469 
 Jarque-Bera   1.687   0.744   0.139   2.558   1.461   1.046 
 Probability   0.430   0.689   0.933   0.278   0.482   0.593 
             
               
 
 
Table 4 – VAR diagnostic tests: residual normality test (Lutkepohl) 
(H0: residuals are multivariate normal) 
                 
                 
Component  Skew.  Chi-sq  df  Prob.    Kurt.  Chi-sq  df  Prob.    Jarque- 
Bera  df  Prob. 
                           
1   0.13   0.25  1   0.62     1.59   7.12  1   0.01     7.37  2   0.02 
2  -0.12   0.19  1   0.66     1.55   7.52  1   0.01     7.71  2   0.02 
3  -0.02   0.01  1   0.95     1.24   11.03  1   0.01     11.03  2   0.01 
4   0.04   0.03  1   0.87     1.91   4.30  1   0.04     4.32  2   0.12 
5   0.06   0.05  1   0.82     1.56   7.39  1   0.01     7.44  2   0.02 
6   0.09   0.13  1   0.72     1.64   6.65  1   0.01     6.77  2   0.03 
                           
Joint     0.649  6   0.99      44.01  6  0.00    44.66  12   0.00 
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Table 5 – VAR diagnostic tests: lag order selection 
             
               Lag  LogL  LR  FPE  AIC  SC  HQ 
             
              0   325.650  NA    3.33e-11  -7.09766  -6.40797  -6.82024 
1   1090.81   1350.27   1.19e-18  -24.2543   -22.5301*   -23.5607* 
2   1128.94   61.9144   1.15e-18  -24.3046  -21.5458  -23.1949 
3   1168.47   58.5918   1.11e-18  -24.3875  -20.5942  -22.8618 
4   1208.92    54.2555*    1.08e-18*  -24.4923  -19.6645  -22.5504 
5   1246.37   44.9327   1.19e-18   -24.5263*  -18.6639  -22.1683 
             
              * indicates lag order selected by the specific criterion.       
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level); FPE: Final prediction error; AIC: Akaike 
information criterion; SC: Schwarz information criterion; HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
Table 6 – Forecast error variance decomposition: endogenous variables 
(standard errors in parentheses)  
           
            Time after 
the shock            IP                P           P_IMP            EXR               M2 
                       
 impact  -  -  -  -  0.3 (1.6) 
 1 quarter  0.0 (1.2)  0.0 (0.7)  0.0 (1.2)  0.5 (1.3)  3.6 (4.2) 
 2 quarters  0.4 (1.6)  0.4 (1.7)  0.6 (1.9)  0.4 (1.4)  4.2 (4.8) 
 1 year  3.5 (4.3)  3.4 (4.4)  2.5 (3.9)  3.2 (3.7)  6.5 (7.0) 
 2 years  21.9 (10.1)  5.6 (6.7)  10.6 (7.8)  5.1 (4.2)  4.7 (6.5) 
 3 years  22.9 (10.2)  9.3 (8.9)  10.3 (7.6)  4.0 (5.2)  3.6 (6.1) 
           
            Percentage of the variance of the column variable’s forecast error at the various horizon 
attributable to the monetary policy shock. 
 
Table 7 – Forecast error variance decomposition: other aggregates 
(standard errors in parentheses)  
         
          Time after 
the shock            UR          GFINV               W               C 
                   
 impact  0.2 (1.7)  0.0 (1.3)  0.0 (1.3)  0.2 (1.8) 
 1 quarter  9.2 (6.0)  0.1 (1.7)  4.4 (3.9)  0.1 (1.6) 
 2 quarters  9.8 (7.0)  1.3 (2.5)  5.7 (5.0)  0.3 (2.0) 
 1 year  13.0 (7.8)  8.9 (6.9)  7.6 (6.5)  8.1 (6.2) 
 2 years  15.7 (9.1)  28.6 (12.2)  5.9 (5.8)  15.5 (9.4) 
 3 years  17.0 (10.1)  31.5 (12.6)  7.0 (6.4)  15.8 (9.8) 
         
          Each variable was added as the last one to the original 6 variables VAR. UR: 
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